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Abstract
A prevailing thought is that generics have a covert modal operator at logical
form. I claim that if this is right, the covert generic modality is a weak necessity
modal. In this paper, I provide evidence for this claim and I sketch a theory.
In particular, I will show that there are some important distributional parallels
between generics and sentences with overt weak necessity modals: both sorts
of sentences share behavior in nonmonotonic reasoning environments and
also lack genuine epistemic readings. Acknowledging these parallels and the
connection here is in the service of both our understanding of genericity and of
weak necessity. Finally, I propose an understanding of generics as involving a
covert weak necessity modal and argue that this is a promising path to pursue
in relation to different issues related to the interpretation of generics.
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1 Introduction
This paper is about bare plural constructions such as:
(1) a. Ravens are black.
b. Birds fly.
c. Tigers are striped.
The most salient reading of the sentences in (1) is the generic reading. Each of the
sentences in (1) are true even in the face of counterinstances and seem to have a kind
of quasi-universal flavor. In this paper, I refer to sentences such as those in (1) as
generics. The investigation in this paper, in particular, concerns the underlying form
of generics. There are good motivations going back to, for instance, Heim (1982)
that generics involve a covert modal element. This paper challenges the standard
version of the modal analysis of generics and argues that if we want to analyze
generics in modal terms, we had better hold that the covert generic modality is a
weak necessity modal.
A generally plausible thought concerning the semantics of generics is that they
involve something covert at the level of logical form. One suggestion to begin with
is that the covert element is something along the lines of an adverbial quantifier.
Indeed, a standard test for whether or not a sentence is a generic involves adverbial
quantifier insertion. This test, at least prima facie, gives reason to believe that
generics involve something covert. Krifka et al. (1995) propose the following: check
whether the addition of such adverbs results only in the slightest change of meaning.
If so, we can take the sentence without the adverbial quantifier to be a generic.
Consider, then, the following:
(2) Birds fly.
And combine with an adverb of quantification:
(3) a. Birds usually fly.
b. Birds normally fly.
c. Birds typically fly.
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The additions of usually, normally, and typically seem merely to cause a slight
change in meaning compared to (2).1 Any sort of difference between the examples
in (2) and (3) appears to be due to the former examples being somehow weaker–at
least in the sense that the examples in (3) explicitly advertise their exception-
grantingness.2
A related avenue to pursue might be to consider some other insertions which combine
(2) with various modal auxiliaries and semimodal verbs. It is worth seeing what we
might gather from this and whether any such insertions capture the generic nature of
(2). We can start by considering the strong necessity insertions.
(7) Birds must fly.
(8) Birds have to fly.
These appear a bit odd. The oddness of both (7) and (8) is that they seem as though
to be too strong: these paraphrases somehow fail to take into account the thought
that ‘Birds fly’ admits of exceptions. Perhaps the oddness here is due to the oddness
of the following:
1Note, however, that not just any adverbial quantifier insertion will work to capture the genericity
of (2). Consider:
(4) a. Birds rarely fly.
b. Birds occasionally fly.
c. Birds invariably fly.
The adverbial quantifier test–at least on one way of understanding its import–tells us that if there
is something hidden at the level of logical form, it is something which behaves like an adverbial
quantifier of a certain kind.
2 Note that the exception-granting property here may be witnessed by the following examples:
(5) a. Birds usually fly, but some/many don’t.
b. Birds normally fly, but some/many don’t.
c. Birds typically fly, but some/many don’t.
Somehow, the sentences in (5) appear more natural than:
(6) Birds fly, but some/many don’t.
Three points. First, I take it that there is a difference between (5) and (6). This should be expected,
for these adverbial quantifiers mentioned explicitly indicate the exception-granting character of the
sentences in (3). Second, the many-readings in (5) sound slightly better when we think of them along
the lines of ‘It’s normal for birds to fly, but many actually don’t’. Third, it is worth noting that capacity
readings are salient here; see Schubert & Pelletier (1989) as well as Nickel (2016, ch. 4) and Sterken
(2015a) for further discussion. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for asking me to clarify these
points.
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(9) Birds must fly, but some/many don’t.
(10) Birds have to fly, but some/many don’t.
These sound odd because they appear to be, in some sense, instances of contra-
dictory conjunctions.3 At least one lesson to learn from attempting to formulate a
contradictory conjunction is whether the modals in (7) and (8) sound appropriate
for capturing the putative exception-granting property of ‘Birds fly’. For another
insertion, consider might and must:
(11) Birds might fly.
(12) Birds may fly.
Both (11) and (12) clearly fail to capture the strength of ‘Birds fly’. They simply
appear far too weak. Now let us consider:
(13) Birds can fly.
Although its doubtful that (13) captures the force of generics, there are certainly
circumstances where it sounds appropriate. If we are making a list of the things
that birds can do, a candidate item on that list would be (13). It may be that (13)
isolates a particular reading of ‘Birds fly’, one that perhaps does not happen to be
the ordinary, salient one. Let us now consider:
(14) Birds happen to fly.
(15) Birds are supposed to fly.
It appears as though both (14) and (15) respect the apparent exception-granting
character of generics, although (15) does this better. An issue with (14) is that adding
happen to does not allow for the reading that flying is something that characterizes
birds. A familiar feature of many true generics is that they attribute properties
to noun phrases that are not merely accidental. One thing to consider is that the
following does not lead to a kind of contradictory conjunction and sounds fine:
3For further discussion of contradictory conjunction effects with generics, see Sterken (2013,
2015a).
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(16) Birds are supposed to fly, but some/many don’t.
None of the previous insertions (with the exception of (15)) are so great, but inserting
a weak necessity modal looks very promising:
(17) Birds should fly.
(18) Birds ought to fly.
There appears to be a good sense in which both (17) and (18) capture the force
associated with ‘Birds fly’. That is, we do not get that some particular bird flies
given (17) or (18), and this is an entirely desirable consequence. Indeed, we don’t
get any oddness with the following conjunctions either:
(19) Birds should fly, but some/many don’t.
(20) Birds ought to fly, but some/many don’t.
I should note that exploring these examples is not meant to be in the service of
capturing the right modal auxiliary insertion that captures a something like a ‘correct’
paraphrase of all generics in the bare plural. It has been noted before that no attested
language has any overt manifestation of whatever is taken to be the covert generic
operator.4 The aim here at the outset is only to perform an initial examination of
whether any of these modal insertions can help us capture whatever kind of ‘force’
or ‘flavor’ we are apt to associate with generics.5
The target proposal of interest in this paper is the idea that generics involve a covert
modal operator. I will briefly describe this proposal. To begin with, consider the
standard tripartite rendering of the logical form of generics:
4See Krifka et al. (1995) for discussion of this point.
5Let us even suppose that there is a decent paraphrase available outside the examples we have
already discussed. Here is one to consider:
(21) Birds nonaccidentally fly.
When we considered (14), we saw that it was an inadequate paraphrase because we want the connection
between birds and fly to be a sort of nonaccidental connection. However, (21) is extremely unhelpful
and nonaccidentally happens to be a sort of philosopher’s jargon. Given that this term is quite unnatural,
it is hard to classify it alongside other more natural quantificational expressions in natural language.
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(22) GEN[x1 . . . xn; y1 . . . yn](Restrictor,Matrix)
Here GEN stands for an unpronounced quantifier responsible for the genericness of
generic sentences.6 A prominent approach to GEN is to treat it as a modal operator
in the setting of possible worlds semantics.7 In particular, the idea would work
something like in the following way. Start with the idea that generics resemble
conditional sentences. On the restrictor theory of conditionals, the role of if-clauses
are to restrict the domains of different operators associated with conditionals. Addi-
tionally, this domain restriction is present whether there is a overt operator present.
If there is no overt operator, a covert operator is to be posited (Kratzer, 1986).8
Then, if generics resemble conditional sentences, we ought to similarly posit a covert
modal operator for generics. The core of the idea is to give generics a semantics
along the same lines as the covert modality of conditionals. Following Krifka et al.
(1995), we can give an interpretation for generics as follows:
(23) GEN[x1 . . . xn; y1 . . . yn](Restrictor,Matrix) is true in w relative to a modal
base f and ordering source ≤g(w) iff:
for every x1 . . . xn and every w′ in f (w) such that Restrictor [x1 . . . xn] is true
in w′, there is a world w′′ in f (w) such that w′′ ≤g(w) w′, and for every world
w′′′ ≤g(w) w′′, ∃y1 . . . yn Matrix[x1 . . . xn; y1 . . . yn] is true in w′′′
It is a feature of this proposal that the underlying modal component of characterizing
sentences is along the lines of must.9 An important virtue of this approach is that
it captures the kind of restricted universal quantification over normal cases that
seems as though to be associated with generics. And we get the modal source of the
quantification from an an independently motivated theory of covert quantification in
conditional sentences.
In this paper, however, it is argued that there is a connection between generics and
weak necessity modals to appreciate, and, in particular, the aim is to provide some
evidence for the view that generics involve covert weak necessity modals. The
6See Sterken (2016) for discussion and recent defense of GEN.
7See Dahl (1975), Heim (1982), Kratzer (1981) as well as Krifka et al. (1995) and Sterken (2017)
for further discussion.
8See also Lewis (1975), Heim (1982), Kratzer (1981, 2012)
9Section 2 briefly discusses the semantics of modals in natural language, but see Krifka et al.
(1995) for relevant discussion.
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evidence for this view is based on some interesting and noteworthy distributional
parallels between generics and sentences containing overt weak necessity modals.
This paper also provides a sketch of a theory of generics based on the proposal that
generics involve covert weak necessity. To illustrate the view, I follow the account
of von Fintel & Iatridou (2008). The gist of their account is as follows. Suppose the
standard view that a strong necessity modal (e.g. must) claim is true provided the
proposition under the scope of the modal is true in all of the best worlds. A weak
necessity modal (e.g. should/ought) claim is true provided the proposition under
the scope of the modal is true in the best of the best worlds. That is, weak necessity
modals involve a further domain restriction measure. It is proposed that generics are
doubly domain restricted in the same way, with the secondary domain restriction
involving some notion of normality.
We will proceed as follows. We will examine the covert structure of generics by
looking at the interactions between generics and in view of phrases. Section 2 pro-
vides the relevant background on this matter. Next, I discuss the main distributional
parallels between generics and sentences containing overt weak necessity modals.
Section 3 discusses the shared features of both sorts of sentences in the environment
of defeasible reasoning; Section 4 discusses the claim that both sorts of sentences
do not take genuine epistemic readings. Then, the observations are turned into a
theory. Section 5 sketches and discusses the theory that the covert generic modality
is a weak necessity modal. Section 6 concludes.
2 Modals and in view of phrases
This paper investigates the covert structure of generics. The initial lens from which
we examine this covert structure will be through observing the interactions between
free relative in view of phrases and generic sentences without overt modals. This
will take place from the perspective of the unified semantics for modals in natural
language given in Kratzer (1977, 1981, 1991, 2012). Hence, ultimately, the task is
to look at the influence of context on the meaning of generics.
2.1 In view of phrases and conversational backgrounds
Free relative in view of clauses determine a substantial portion of the meaning of
modal sentences in natural language. To observe this, let us consider the following
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sentences with an eye on the meaning of must in each of them:
(24) a. Oscar the Grouch must have been in the trash can for at least 4 hours
straight.
b. Cookie Monster must share his cookies.
c. Ernie must be home by 6pm.
d. Elmo must learn to use pronouns properly when he speaks.
Now, we supplement these sentences with in view of phrases, allowing us to unpack
much of the meaning of the occurrences of must in (24):
(25) a. In view of his dispositions, Oscar the Grouch must have been in the trash
can for at least 4 hours straight.
b. In view of Sesame Street community norms, Cookie Monster must share
his cookies.
c. In view of Bert’s demands, Ernie must be home by 6pm.
d. In view of the norms of the English language, Elmo must learn to use
pronouns properly when he speaks.
These in view of phrases paraphrase much of what it is the sentences in (24) are
about. The occurrences of must in (25) then end up being neutral occurrences of
must. Such phrases do not tend to be linguistically realized. The relevant information
typically comes from context. We need to do some reconstruction to make explicit
their influence in determining the meaning of natural language modals. Given
that we are engaging in some reconstruction, in view of, at times, can sound quite
unnatural. Sometimes it might be helpful to consider some cousins of in view of
such as according to, given that, in light of, and so on.10
To get a sense of the role of in view of phrases and matters related to Kratzer’s
semantics, I provide a brief overview. Modal statements have three components: a
conversational background, a modal particle, and the prejacent proposition which
the modal takes scope over.
10For ease, I will tend to stick to in view of throughout, though nothing is lost if I use any alternatives.
I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this issue to my attention.
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The conversational background is what every sentence is uttered against–modals
are interpreted with respect to conversational backgrounds. In particular, a conver-
sational background is a function from worlds to sets of propositions. It supplies
information that is usually left inexplicit. Phrases such as in view of determine
conversational backgrounds.
Conversational backgrounds are relative to two things: a modal base and an ordering
source. The role of the modal base is to tell us which worlds are accessible; the
ordering source induces an ordering on the accessible worlds according to how well
they satisfy the prescribed ideals. These are both functions from worlds to sets of
sets of worlds (sets of propositions). The basic picture is that modals quantify over
the best words. These are the worlds that are ideal given the ordering source in
question.11
2.2 Generics under in view of
The main idea that I would like to establish in this section is that in view of phrases,
when combined with generics, tell us what we need to determine a conversational
background for generics. So, this means that in view of phrases, in the case of
generics, must be supplying information to a covert modal.
If in view of phrases are supplying information to a covert generic modal, then
different in view of phrases will affect the genericity, in some important sense, of a
given generic prejacent. We can observe such affects as follows:
(26) a. Birds, in view of their DNA, fly.
b. Birds, in view of scientific testimony, fly.
c. Birds, in view of their dispositions, fly.
d. Birds, in view of what I’ve seen, fly.
11Where f is the modal base and where g is the ordering source, we can give the semantics for the
necessity modal and the possibility modal as follows:
[[Must ϕ]] f ,g,v = {w | Best( f (w), g(w)) ⊆ [[ϕ]] f ,g,v}
[[May ϕ]] f ,g,v = {w | Best( f (w), g(w)) ∩ [[ϕ]] f ,g,v , ∅}
This formalization in terms of the Best function follows Portner (2009) and the semantics here
assumes the limit assumption, that is, there are always accessible ideal worlds. The Best function
selects the most ideal worlds from its input, and obeys the ordering ≤g(w). That is, w′ ≤g(w) w′′ iff
{p ∈ g(w) | w′′ ∈ p} ⊆ {p ∈ g(w) | w′ ∈ p}. So, given a proposition in g(w), w′ is at least as good as w′′.
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The examples in (26) show that a generic such as ‘Birds fly’ can, on different
occasions, receive variable interpretations. It is important to note that Kratzer uses
in view of data in the same spirit to make related points about modal sentences in
general. The lesson to take away is that we should treat the variability of generics
in very much the way we treat the variability associated with different readings of
modal sentences.
Sterken (2015b) has recently discussed the contextual variability of generics. She
claims that such variability is widespread and distinctive. The claim here is that it is
helpful to look at the variability in terms of in view of phrases. For instance, let’s
discuss one of her cases, which is taken from Nickel (2008):12
(27) Dobermans have floppy ears.
Dobermans are born with floppy ears, and so we can easily imagine that in a sort of
evolutionary biology context that (27) sounds totally fine. However, (27) comes out
as false in certain dog-breeding contexts. Consider Nickel’s example text:
(28) While Labradors and Golden Retrievers have floppy ears, Dobermans don’t.
Dobermans have pointy ears.
These Nickel-effects can be easily recast using in view of phrases:
(29) Dobermans, in view of evolutionary facts, have floppy ears.
(30) Doberman, in view of the practices of dog-breeders, have pointy ears.
If we control the interpretation of (27), it is very easy to witness the variability
here.13 We could even construct a sentence which suitably combines (29) and (30):
12Also see Nickel (2016).
13In fact, the effect here could seem more ordinary, for we can imagine something similar for ‘Birds
fly’. Suppose there are bird-breeders who like to inject birds with a mystery non-flying juice. We
could then have the following:
(31) Birds, in view of the injection practices, do not fly.
(32) Birds, in view of evolutionary facts, fly.
We could even imagine a person growing up in Antarctica who has only seen penguins. The context in
such a case would have it come out as false that birds fly. In any case, the main point to emphasize is
that the background context is very important and that in view of phrases help reveal the variability.
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(33) Dobermans, given evolutionary facts, have floppy ears, however, given dog-
breeding practices, they have pointy ears.
In this way, we see that the variability of generics can be witnessed in a systematic
and principled way by supplementing them with in view of phrases. It appears as
though the most plausible explanation of what is happening in such cases is that
these in view of phrases make explicit the background information which informs a
covert generic modal.
There are cases, however, where we have in view of phrases combined with non-
modal, non-generic sentences. Consider such a sentence in (34) and then combined
with a phrase to specify some background contextual information in (35):
(34) John danced with Sue.
(35) Given what I’ve heard, John danced with Sue.
On the basis of examples like (35) one might be skeptical that the combination of
in view of phrases and generics tells us anything about the existence or nature of
a covert generic modal, for presumably there is no such modal in more ordinary
sentences like (34).14 If in view of phrases provide information to a covert modal in
generics, what are they doing in cases like (35)?
The answer is that, in cases such as (35), we have made explicit some background
evidential information.15 English is not evidentially marked; however, the idea is that
some reconstruction can tell us the source of information that a speaker possesses.
Here’s some reason to think that phrases like given what I’ve heard in (35) provide
evidential information (presumably to a tacit epistemic modal). Following Murray
(2010, 2017), evidentials contribute not-at-issue content to restrict the common
ground. A feature of not-at-issue content is that it is not directly challengeable.
The at-issue content, for instance the assertion that ‘John danced with Sue’, is
challengeable. Consider the following two responses to (35):
(36) No, they didn’t dance.
(37) # No, you didn’t.
14I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on various points related to in view of
phrases.
15I owe this point to discussion with Josh Dever.
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So, if a phrase like given what I’ve heard is providing us with not-at-issue content,
then we should understand it as placing a restriction on the common ground which
plays the role of providing evidential information.
Now consider in view of phrases which select non-doxastic conversational back-
grounds to combine with non-modal, non-generic sentences. These do not combine
well. Here are just a few attempts at combining with (34):
(38) a. In view of the laws, John danced with Sue.
b. In view of their DNA, John danced with Sue.
c. In view of their dispositions, John danced with Sue.
That such conversational backgrounds do not combine well with non-modal, non-
generic sentences should be expected, for there is obviously no overt modal available
to affect, nor is there good reason to think with such sentences that there is a covert
modal to affect16 (other than a tacit epistemic modal which receives evidential
information).17
We will proceed with the hypothesis that there are certain, relevant kinds of in view
of phrases which restrict the domain of generics. This will help us achieve some
16There is more to be said about the interactions between the evidential in view of phrases and
generics, I come back to this issue in Section 4. There I argue, inter alia, that doxastic in view of
phrases do not affect the generic covert modal at all.
17Additionally, it is also worth noting that not just any in view of phrase will affect any available
modal, whether covert or overt. I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to issue to my
attention and I would like to consider their examples. Consider the following combinations of in view
of phrases and generics:
(39) a. In view of the weather, birds fly north.
b. In view of grandma’s pets, birds live in grandma’s house.
If the in view of phrases in (39) combine well with the generics they are attached to, then there is a
worry, as the reviewer rightly notes, that we can overgenerate readings for many bare plural sentences.
But there is good reason to think that these in view of phrases do not combine well at all. Let’s try
adding an overt modal to the sentences in (39):
(40) a. In view of the weather, birds should fly north.
b. In view of grandma’s pets, birds should live in grandma’s house.
Now observe that when we add should it does not appear as though these in view of phrases really
help unpack the meanings of the overt modals in (40). This gives us reason to believe they wouldn’t be
affecting a generic covert modal in the original examples, for, if we ought to respect the distributional
parallels, this would confirm any discomfort with the original examples.
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further insights concerning genericity, in particular, concerning the nature of the
covert generic modal. The rest of the paper will focus on making the case that the
covert generic modal is a weak necessity modal. In the next two sections, I provide
some evidence to hold this view by showing some parallels between generics and
sentences with overt weak necessity modals.
3 Generic defeasible reasoning
In this section, I argue that generics display very much the same behavior as sen-
tences with overt weak necessity modals in nonmonotonic reasoning environments.
This parallel gives us reason to believe that generics involve a covert weak necessity
modal.
3.1 Parallel patterns of reasoning
The theorists who investigate the link between generics and defeasible reasoning are
motivated by the need to account for the defeasible validity of inference patterns
such as:
(41) Defeasible Modus Ponens
If Tweety is a bird, (normally/generally/etc.) Tweety flies
Tweety is a bird
Tweety flies
(42) Generic Modus Ponens
Birds fly
Tweety is a bird
Tweety flies
The conclusion ‘Tweety flies’ in both (41) and (42) follows not deductively, but
given some adequate nonmonotonic consequence relation between a set of premises
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and a set of conclusions: Γ |∼ ϕ.18
My interest here is to examine what is happening when we draw defeasible conse-
quences from generics. In particular, we will take a look at what are the adequate
ways to characterize the conclusions of defeasible reasoning in order to, in a sense,
gauge the force of these consequences. So, suppose we have the premises of (42),
namely ‘Birds fly’ and ‘Tweety is a bird’. What we will do is look for a paraphrase
that, in some sense, respects the potential for retraction that is characteristic of
defeasible reasoning. Consider the following:
(43) Tweety should fly.
(44) Tweety ought to fly.
I submit that both (43) and (44) sound appropriate as conclusions of defeasible
reasoning. In particular, paraphrasing things this way respects the potential for
retraction:
(45) Tweety should fly, but doesn’t.
(46) Tweety ought to fly, but doesn’t.
So, generics appear to license defeasible consequences with, as it were, the force of
weak necessity. Sentences with overt weak necessity modals license consequences
in the same way. Let us consider a defeasible pattern of reasoning using a sentence
with such an overt modal in the major premise.
18Briefly, a logic is nonmonotonic if the following monotonicity property fails of its consequence
relation: if ϕ is a consequence of Γ, then ϕ is a consequence of Γ ∪ ψ. If the monotonicity property
fails, then a conclusion can be prevented by adding further premises. The aim in these frameworks is
to reach defeasible conclusions. An important feature of nonmonotonic logics is that they allow for
retraction: given the information that ‘Tweety is a bird’, and that ‘birds fly’, we infer that ‘Tweety
flies’. But if we find out that Tweety has a broken wing, then we would retract our conclusion that
‘Tweety flies’, and instead infer that ‘Tweety doesn’t fly’. This is a major contrast to the situation in
classical deductive formalisms where, once a conclusion is established, it remains established, for
adding additional premises keeps validity intact. So it is in this sense that nonmonotonic logics allow
for retraction and monotonic logics do not. Indeed, this is taken to be reason that nonmonotonic logics
are held to be useful in characterizing common sense reasoning as well as the role generics play in
such reasoning patterns.
14
(47) Residents of Sesame Street ought to share their cookies
Cookie Monster is a resident of Sesame Street
Cookie Monster ought to share his cookies
It would be odd to conclude that ‘Cookie Monster shares his cookies’; things sound
much better when we add ought. It is true that Cookie Monster ought to share his
cookies, though we all know that he’s not actually going to (or at least do so very
reluctantly). It would not sound appropriate to say that he might share his cookies;
likewise, it would not sound appropriate to say that he must share his cookies. It is
in this sense that sentences with overt weak necessity modals share something in
common with generics: the defeasible consequences we derive sound appropriate
when we add an overt weak necessity modal. Additionally, if we were to take the
generic version of the premise of (47), that is, ‘Residents of Sesame Street share
their cookies’, the appropriate way of embedding the defeasible conclusion would
be the same.
So, generics and sentences with overt weak necessity modals share an important
link to each other in nonmonotonic reasoning environments. What we should take
away from the parallel behavior is that generics must have something like a covert
weak necessity modal, for this would be an explanation of the parallels. And this
also means that if we want to understand the relationship between generics and
defeasible reasoning, we should also look to study patterns of defeasible reasoning
involving ought and should.
3.2 A remark on the reasoning data
Before moving forward, it is worth nothing that there are generics from which it
does not appear that we can draw any reasonable consequences. This makes for a
general worry for those who investigate the links between generics and defeasible
reasoning, as it undermines the strength of such links. A challenge of this form is put
forth by Leslie (2007). The challenge is based on inferences such as the following:
(48) Mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus
Buzzy is a mosquito
Buzzy carries the West Nile Virus
15
Leslie holds that this is not a very attractive inference and that the existence of such
cases means that schemas like (41) and (42) do not hold for all generics. However, I
think this challenge is too quick and that it is worth taking another look at her case.
Let us begin by finding an in view of phrase that helps us make sense of the generic
premise in (48). Perhaps the following are some bad attempts:
(49) a. Mosquitoes, in view of scientific testimony, carry West Nile Virus.
b. Mosquitoes, in view of their dispositions, carry West Nile Virus.
c. Mosquitoes, in view of their DNA, carry West Nile Virus.
I am inclined to hold that under these in view of phrases, we get false interpretations
of ‘Mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus’. Suitable non-doxastic readings do not
appear easily available. Perhaps the following in view of phrases with an apparent
‘epistemic’ flavor help provide some ‘reasonable’ readings:
(50) a. Mosquitoes, in view of what I’ve been told, carry West Nile Virus.
b. Mosquitoes, in view of what I’ve seen, carry West Nile Virus.
These doxastic in view of phrases help us draw out some suitable contexts for the
major premise of (48).19 A consequence is that the conclusion that ‘Buzzy carries
West Nile Virus’ seems reasonable–given a sort of doxastic in view of phrase in the
generic premise–when read in the following ways:
(51) a. Buzzy, in view of what I’ve been told, carries West Nile Virus.
b. Buzzy, in view of what I’ve seen, carries West Nile Virus.
In particular, we should read the sentences in (51) as restricted according to some
evidential information. So, the idea is that these conclusions are warranted on the
19However, stay tuned for some remarks in the following section on the status of generics evaluated
with doxastic in view of phrases. I will argue that such in view of phrases do not affect the covert
generic modal. This makes for another distributional parallel with sentences containing overt weak
necessity modals–there is good reason to believe that such sentences do not admit of genuine epistemic
readings. Anyway, there is an intuition that ‘Mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus’ is a true generic, so it
must have some suitable non-doxastic interpretation or other.
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basis of the source of evidence given in the major premise, thereby making these
conclusions defeasibly acceptable.
The main upshot of looking at Leslie’s example in a different way is that perhaps
there is a way to salvage such cases where it does not appear as though reasonable
conclusions can be drawn from generics. The suspicion is that, at least in some cases,
those who judge (48) as bad do so because they may be interpreting the premises
and the conclusion with respect to different sorts of conversational backgrounds.20
To recap, the main point of interest is the parallel behavior of generics and sentences
with overt weak necessity modals. We observe this through the relationship between
generics and the defeasible conclusions we draw from them. While it appears
as though many generics do not warrant reasonable conclusions, the same holds
for sentences with overt weak necessity modals. In this way, it does not matter
whether the difficult inferences involving generics are or are not salvageable. Given
this, I claim that there is indeed interest in investigating the nonmonotonicity of
inferences from generics. In the next section, we move on to discussing another
parallel between generics and sentences with overt weak necessity modals, namely
that both sorts of sentences do not receive genuine doxastic interpretations.
4 Doxastic backgrounds and genericity
In Section 2, it was noted, in the case of non-modal, non-generic sentences, that
doxastic in view of phrases affect the interpretation of a tacit epistemic modal. In
particular, such conversational backgrounds concern the evidential state of a speaker.
20Yet there is, in some sense, the overriding intuition that inferences such as (48) are bad. Indeed,
generally, there is some kind of difference between the reasonableness of inferences like (42) and (48),
whether or not there is a way to salvage (48). It is worth noting that, strictly speaking, these defeasible
inferences involving generics such as (42) and (48) are bad. There is a sense in which such inferences
appear fine because they are reasonable unless we have defeating information. However, there is a
sort of oddity. Consider the case of ‘Birds fly’. It is plausible to think that this generic is somehow
about ideal or normal birds. But Tweety is an actual bird. The oddity is that when we conclude that
Tweety flies we do so on the proviso that the normal or ideal birds of interest are relevantly similar
to the actual birds. Without such an auxiliary assumption even the inference involving ‘Birds fly’ is
going to be unreasonable. The reason why there is a kind of inferential badness in the case of the
mosquito inference is because we are unable to make a similar auxiliary assumption. On the reading
that makes ‘Mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus’ true we would have it that this sentence talks about
mosquitoes in a certain ideal or normal way. But Buzzy is an actual mosquito. We know that most
actual mosquitoes don’t carry West Nile Virus. So we do not operate under the assumption that the
actual mosquitoes are relevantly similar to the ideal or normal ones that we are talking about. Thank
you to Matthew McKeever for discussion on the points in this section.
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It was also noted that non-doxastic in view of phrases do not combine well with
non-modal, non-generic sentences.
The present section begins by observing that there are generics that do not receive
any reasonable non-doxastic interpretations. What we learn from this observation
is that only non-doxastic conversational backgrounds affect the interpretation of
a generic. Then, I will argue for the claim that generics do not receive genuine
epistemic interpretations and that this is a feature that is shared with sentences that
have overt weak necessity modals. This gives further reason to believe that the
generic covert modality is a weak necessity modal.
4.1 On the lack of epistemic interpretations for generics
There are many generics that only appear to have true readings given doxastic in
view of phrases. For instance, consider the following prejudicial generics:
(52) a. Blondes are dumb.
b. Black people are violent.
c. Muslims are terrorists.
There is no non-doxastic reading that could make any of the sentences in (52) true.
For instance, consider:
(53) a. In view of their DNA, blondes are dumb.
b. In view of scientific testimony, blondes are dumb.
c. In view of their dispositions, blondes are dumb.
(54) a. In view of their DNA, black people are violent.
b. In view of scientific testimony, black people are violent.
c. In view of their dispositions, black people are violent.
(55) a. In view of their DNA, Muslims are terrorists.
b. In view of scientific testimony, Muslims are terrorists.
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c. In view of their dispositions, Muslims are terrorists.
These readings of the various sentences in (52) are plainly false. The following
doxastic readings of (52) can only come out as true just in case an agent has the
appropriate states of mind:
(56) a. In view of what I’ve seen, blondes are dumb.
b. In view of what I’ve heard, Black people are violent.
c. In view of what Smith tells me, Muslims are terrorists.
However, this does not mean that any of the sentences in (52) are true generics.21
The doxastic in view of phrases present in (56) do not affect the covert generic modal
at all; instead, they provide information to a tacit epistemic modal. This is because
doxastic in view of phrases, when combined with generics, contribute not-at-issue
content, which does not end up affecting the genericity of the prejacent.
There are a number of generics that only have ‘reasonable’ readings under such
doxastic in view of phrases. I will not claim that this is a general feature of prejudicial
or ‘troublesome’ generics. The claim of interest at present concerns the variance
between doxastic and non-doxastic conversational backgrounds and their interactions
with generics.
My aim in this section is to argue that both generics and sentences with overt weak
necessity modals share the feature that doxastic conversational backgrounds do not
affect their interpretation; that is, there are no genuine epistemic interpretations of
such sentences (at least in a certain technical sense of ‘epistemic’). So, in order to
do so, I continue to build the point that generics do not receive genuine doxastic
interpretations.
First, if generics can have genuine epistemic readings, we should expect there to
at least be a case where the only available reading of a generic is an epistemic
21Think of the sentences in (52) as being very much as bad as the following:
(57) Philosophers have wings.
(57) is plainly false and can only receive true readings under doxastic in view of phrases. And the
likely reason (57) is judged to be false is because, uncontroversially, there is no non-doxastic in view
of phrase that can make it true. The asymmetry between the sentences in (52) and (57) is that there
are people out there who judge sentences in (52) as having reasonable interpretations.
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one. That is, we need a case where the only available interpretation of a generic is
under a doxastic in view of phrase. Let us consider a generic with such a doxastic
conversational background:
(58) In view of what I believe, mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus.
This claim is true so long as an agent has the appropriate belief states. However,
that the doxastic generic claim is true is entirely uninteresting. When we separate
generics into true generics and false generics, we do not hold that this division at
all depends upon belief states. If we did care about doxastic readings, then what it
means to be a true generic is entirely trivial.
Another reason doxastic conversational backgrounds are irrelevant when theorizing
about genericity is that such statements are akin to belief sentences:
(59) I believe that mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus.
The irrelevance is that belief sentences are not generic sentences: genericity does not
survive through embedding under doxastic operators. We would not hold that the
embedded proposition (whatever its underlying nature may be) is true just because
the belief sentence is true. So, even having a case where the only available reading
seems epistemic does not matter if we want to investigate whether generics can have
genuine epistemic readings.22
Second, for further evidence, let us see if there can be genuine cases of faultless
disagreement involving doxastic readings of generics. But as we have already
observed, if a generic is true, it’s true provided a suitable non-doxastic in view
of phrase. So, whatever is going on with disagreement involving generics under
doxastic in view of phrases is irrelevant and uninteresting. We can imagine two
parties disagreeing over whether philosophers have red wings or blue wings, but we
do not take it that the disagreement has anything to do with the covert modality of
generics; presumably it instead has something do with the false and irreconcilable
beliefs of the two disputants. Additionally, let us consider a case of disagreement
involving a true non-doxastic generic claim and a contrary doxastic generic claim.
Suppose someone disagrees with ‘Birds fly’ and holds ‘In view of what I believe,
birds do not fly’. We take it that the former party is correct and the latter party is
22Thank you to Quentin Pharr for discussion on this point.
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wrong. So, there is no interesting case of disagreement here that will tell us anything
about whether generics can involve genuine epistemic modality.
Third, we should expect epistemic-might claims to be entailed by the apparent
epistemic readings of generics. Consider the following sentence:
(60) Dobermans have floppy ears.
On a doxastic construal of this sentence, we get an epistemic-might claim entailed
in a non-generic environment. A non-doxastic construal of this sentence entails a
might claim, but not an epistemic-might claim. For instance, we would get:
(61) In view of evolutionary facts, it might be the case that Dobermans have floppy
ears.
But this might is not an epistemic-might. So, epistemic-might claims do not follow
from true generics.
4.2 On the lack of epistemic interpretations for weak necessity modals
Given the evidence that generics do not receive genuine doxastic interpretations, we
want a view of the covert generic modality that allows us to block such interpretations.
The weak necessity view is promising because there are independent arguments for
the view that sentences with overt weak necessity modals do not receive genuine
epistemic interpretations.
Yalcin (2016) has observed that should and ought do not admit of genuine epistemic
readings, and makes a strong case for this.23 Let us consider his example:
Consider a case which many would, at least initially, take as drawing
out the putative epistemic reading of the English modals ought and
should. Suppose Jones is in a crowded office building when a severe
earthquake hits. The building topples. By sheer accident, nothing falls
upon Jones; the building just happens to crumble in such a way so as
23This observation is anticipated by Copley (2004, 2006).
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not to touch the place where he is standing. He emerges from the rubble
as the only survivor. (Yalcin 2016, 231)
After the incident, suppose Jones says either:
(62) I should be dead right now.
(63) I ought to be dead right now.
In such situations, we do not have standard circumstantial readings of (62) and (63).
These utterances do not involve considering, say, certain deontic or bouletic prefer-
ences. Given the unavailability of other readings, it looks plausible that what we
have here are paradigmatic cases of epistemic readings of (62) and (63). If there’s
an epistemic reading here, it would be reasonable to expect that epistemic readings
of the weaker modals might and may are entailed–but this is not the case:
(64) # I might be dead right now.
(65) # I may be dead right now.
These sentences appear defective in the context as described. As Yalcin notes, a
sentence which entails a defective sentence is presumably itself defective. However,
Jones’s utterances do not appear defective, so we should not think that (62) and (63)
entail (64) and (65). This brings some support to the claim that there is no genuine
epistemic reading of either (62) or (63).
Additionally, a modal which would be uncontroversially epistemic could not be used
here either. Consider:
(66) # I am probably be dead right now.
These data points work as evidence for the idea that should and ought do not have
true epistemic readings. On their own, we don’t, however, get a full defence of
the claim that these modals can never get genuine epistemic readings. For that
discussion, I refer the reader to Yalcin (2016); here my interest is only to present the
motivating evidence.
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Generics and sentences with overt weak necessity modals share the feature that
they do not take genuine epistemic readings. There are independent, yet related,
reasons for why both types of sentences do not take such readings. This parallel
gives support to the view that the covert generic modal is a weak necessity modal.24
Now, we move on to use these observations and parallels to motivate a theory.
5 Weak necessity semantics for generics
The evidence presented in this paper challenges the standard modal analysis of GEN
and points to the view that generics involve covert weak necessity modals. In this
section, I give a sketch of a theory of generics based on a covert weak necessity
modal operator. This is motivated in light of the various parallels that we have
observed throughout the paper between generics and sentences containing overt
weak necessity modals. After this, I go on to discuss various cases of interest.
The main contrast between the approach offered here and the standard approach will
lie in an account of the difference between weak and strong necessity modals. I will
follow von Fintel & Iatridou (2008) on their account of weak necessity modals. This
will inform our theory of the covert generic modality. The main idea behind the
proposal of von Fintel & Iatridou (2008) is that weak necessity modals arise from the
promotion of a secondary ordering source of a strong necessity modal. In particular,
the idea is that strong necessity modals tell us that the prejacent proposition is
true in all of the preferred worlds; weak necessity modals tell us that the prejacent
proposition is true in all of the best of the preferred worlds. In this way, weak
necessity modals carve out a finer portion of the modal base due to a secondary
ordering source.
Following this account of weak necessity modals, the guiding idea, here, will be that
the generic covert modal is sensitive to two ordering sources: a primary ordering
source and a secondary ordering source. The former ordering source will be given
by the proposition picked out by an in view of phrase; the latter ordering source is
determined by an additional measure.
Thus far, we have observed the various ways in which generics get their domains
restricted by in view of phrases. These free relative clauses that we supply come
24Additionally, note that it is widely acknowledged that must, as it occurs covertly in conditionals,
can take epistemic readings, but generics can’t–so there is also general pressure against the idea that
we should see generics as conditional sentences in the usual sense.
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with a proposition that helps us specify a modal base and allows us to impose an
ordering on the set of worlds in question. For instance, we are able to specify
different conversational backgrounds for a given generic:
(67) a. In view of their DNA, birds fly.
b. In view of scientific testimony, birds fly.
c. In view of their dispositions, birds fly.
The information, however, given in the free relative clauses in (67) will not be
enough for our purposes. These clauses give us what is required to restrict the
domain of a strong necessity modal. The intuitive way of determining the truth
conditions based on what is given in (67) will be to take the contextually determined
best worlds and see whether in all of those words the prejacent is true. A further
restriction will give us weak necessity, which will give us what we need to capture
genericity.
The subsidiary ordering source, from a cross-linguistic perspective, according to
von Fintel & Iatridou (2008), can be brought about by counterfactual marking. They
claim that in a wide variety of languages, counterfactual morphology, in combination
with a strong necessity modal, returns a construction that is semantically equivalent
to the English ought. Generics do not manifest themselves with overt modal lexical
items, so the strategy here will be to introduce some counterfactual marking to help
us capture the secondary restriction.
Another precedent for introducing counterfactual marking as a way to interpret
sentences containing weak necessity modals comes from Yalcin (2016). At least in
the cases where a weak necessity modal takes a non-genuine epistemic reading, the
suggestion is that it receives a reading that has something to do with the way things
normally unfold.25 Recall either utterance of Jones after the earthquake:
(68) I should be dead right now.
(69) I ought to be dead right now.
Roughly, the idea is that the interpretation of these sentences is somehow restricted
according to normality, in some sense or other. Furthermore, an initial gloss of the
relationship between weak necessity modals and normality is given as follows:
25Although Yalcin’s suggestion was, in particular, about non-genuine ‘epistemic’ readings of should
and ought, I think that the point here generalizes.
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(70) α should/ought to F ≈ It is normal for α to F
However, the problem with this gloss is that it would be odd for Jones to say:
(71) # It is normal for me to be dead right now.
But (71) does sound better when adding some standard counterfactual morphology:
(72) It would be normal for me to be dead right now.
Then, following Yalcin (2016), a better gloss of the relationship between ought/should
and normality is as follows:
(73) α should/ought to F ≈ It would be normal for α to F
We can then use (73) to make manifest an overt construal of the affect of a secondary
ordering source:
(74) a. In view of their DNA, it would be normal for birds to fly.
b. In view of scientific testimony, it would be normal for birds to fly.
c. In view of their dispositions, it would be normal for birds to fly.
The counterfactual morphology present in (74) represents a further restriction which
then allows the modal to quantify over the very best of the worlds picked out by
the various in view of phrases. We, then, check whether in this more restricted set
of worlds whether the prejacent holds. Additionally, and crucially, the subsidiary
restriction may rule out the actual world, thus allowing for the coherence of the idea
that it would be normal for birds to fly but that a given actual bird does not fly; this
helps make sense of the fact that generics grant exceptions.
It is also important to note that, strictly speaking, the subsidiary restriction need not
be a normality restriction. What we need is a sort of way of putting the restriction
which serves the function of providing a counterfactual displacement which may
remove the actual world from the information states relevant to assessing the truth-
conditions. To illustrate the point, let us have a look at the following generics:
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(75) a. Oysters make round pearls.
b. Scots wear kilts.
c. Stealing is wrong.
d. If you make a promise, you should keep it.
Now, we consider the generics in (75) supplemented by the counterfactual morphol-
ogy which makes the subsidiary ordering source overt:
(76) a. It would be ideal for Oysters make round pearls.
b. It would be ideal for Scots wear kilts.
c. It would be ideal not to steal.
d. If you make a promise, it would be ideal for you to keep it.
These ways of putting the restrictions on the modal base in (76) are preferred over
normality restrictions. Consider (75)a. It appears as though many oysters produce
pearls that are not perfectly round. At least in some sense, a normal pearl is one
that is not perfectly round. A way to pick out the pearls of interest is to pick out
certain ideal ones like we have in (76)a. The idea, then, is that we are likely talking
about ideal pearls when we use (75)a. Similar remarks apply for (75)b. It isn’t
quite normal for Scots to wear kilts, though restricted in various ways to certain
cultural ideals we get the worlds where the prejacent holds. Now consider the moral
principles in (75). Taking for granted the idea that moral principles are like generics,
the more suitable way of capturing their genericity is by selecting the ideal world
where the right conditions hold, that is, worlds where the circumstances are such
that there are no cases of stealing which are morally permissible.26 It is true that,
normally, stealing is wrong, but we can more aptly capture the moral content of the
generic with (76)c. Similar remarks apply for the conditional construction in (76)d.
This way of putting things does a much better job at capturing the moral content
than an overt appeal to normality. We would have ‘If you make a promise, then it
would be normal for you to keep it’, but, when phrased this way, doesn’t quite do
the job we want.
One can think of using ‘it would be ideal’ to capture the additional restriction as
having something to do with normality in some broader sense. That is, we can think
26For further evidence and discussion of the claim that moral principles are generics, see Thakral
(2018).
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of this way of capturing the restriction as isolating a particular sense of normality.
It is convenient, though, in my mind, perhaps not entirely essential to think of the
further required restriction in this way.
Here is another way to think about the additional measure provided by weak neces-
sity modals. A suggestion from von Fintel & Iatridou (2008) is to construe things in
a metalinguistic fashion. Consider:
(77) If we were in a context in which the secondary ordering source were promoted,
then it would be a strong necessity that...
It is useful to compare this to a move by Nickel (2016) who suggests adding a
counterfactual element into the semantics of generics, along with a reference to
normality. One way of doing this, Nickel suggests, is to take a generic like ‘Lions
have four legs’ and interpret it as follows:
(78) If there was a lion that was normal with respect to the number of legs for
lions, then all lions that are normal with respect to the number of legs for lions
would have four legs.
The idea we are after in capturing weak necessity is that the weak necessity results
from embedding a strong necessity claim in a counterfactual environment.27 The
counterfactual embedding is what can move the world of evaluation away from the
actual world. The in view of phrase places the restriction over the strong necessity
claim. And the counterfactual restriction places a further restriction on top of this.
Generics work in the very same way. Their initial restrictions come from in view of
phrases. We have seen that such phrases play the role of determining different read-
ings for a given generic. This is because, at least with non-doxastic conversational
backgrounds, we are able to specify contexts that affect the interpretation of a given
generic. And, as we have seen, genericity, just like with sentences containing overt
weak necessity modals, comes with an additional proviso: we not only select the
best worlds given the conversational background, we select the best of these best
worlds. This is the main idea behind the proposal. The best of the best worlds are
the worlds determined by some sort of additional measure based on normality or
ideality.
27See also Silk (forthcoming) for comparison and further discussion.
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I close this section by discussing how the theory sketched here might approach
various more problematic cases of generics. In particular, we will consider cases of
generics which appear true yet the prejacent holds only for a minority; we will also
consider cases of generics which appear false yet the prejacent holds for a majority
of instances.
First, the majority cases. A paradigm example of the kind of generic I have in mind
is ‘Books are paperbacks’. The standard suggestion is that such generics are false;
the weak necessity view can help us see why this is so even though the majority of
books are paperbacks. If we attempt to make the ordering sources overt, then we
could have something like:
(79) In view of bookbinding practices, it would be normal for books to be paper-
backs.
The basic idea is that we consider the set of worlds where a certain kind of bookbind-
ing practice is held fixed (presumably one where many of the books are produced
in paperback form). And then we consider a set of these worlds based on whatever
ideals or norms we are apt to associate with books. But in this set of worlds it is
not the case that it is considered normal for a book to be paperback. So, according
to the weak necessity view, when we feed in information pertaining to norms and
ideals, we would predict that ‘Books are paperbacks’ is false. The weak necessity
restriction allows this sentence to be false no matter how prevalent the relevant
bookbinding practices are.
Second, the minority cases. Examples of cases I have in mind are sentences such
as ‘Mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus’. One feature of this generic is that it does
not easily appear to take a genuine non-doxastic reading. This is partly why this
sentence is associated with a weak inferential profile. But there is the more obvious
weakness that very few mosquitoes actually have the virus. What the weak necessity
view has to offer is that it could capture such weakness. In particular, it captures
the idea that it’s false that many actual mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus, yet,
at the same time, it’s true that, in some sense, they ought to be carriers of the
disease. Perhaps a plausible reading for the generic claim could be that it’s somehow
reasonable to expect that mosquitoes are carriers of the virus. Indeed, the idea is
that they are the very species that is a carrier of the virus. The weak necessity view
is positioned to capture this kind of intuition because of the nature of displacement
associated with weak necessity modals. We pick out a suitable in view of reading
and then consider a weak necessity restriction which asks us to consider norms and
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ideals. Weak necessity modal claims do not depend on actual circumstances; they
instead very much depend on the ideals and norms we are apt to associate with these
sentences–and this could give some leverage in the case of weak generics.
6 Conclusion
I have defended the claim that the generic covert modality is a weak necessity modal.
The distributional parallels between generics and sentences containing overt weak
necessity modals point us to this view. In light of these parallels, I have presented
a new way of thinking about the generic covert modal as a weak necessity modal
and discussed how this would approach various cases of generics. The hope is that
we have made some progress in both our understanding of generics and of weak
necessity modals. There is much more to be said on understanding genericity in
terms of weak necessity, and there is much more to understand about weak necessity.
I leave this for future work and other researchers.
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